FREE WILL AND MORAL EVIL

by Keith Lovin

The existence of evil is the most intractable problem confronting the orthodox theist in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The theist must be able to show that the occurrence of evil in the world is somehow compatible with the existence of a God who is omnipotent (i.e., one who can do anything which is not logically impossible), omniscient (i.e., one whose knowledge is absolute and without limitation), and omnibenevolent (i.e., one whose goodness is such as to eliminate evil wherever possible). In short, the theist must hold that there is no unnecessary or gratuitous evil in the world. For if a world containing less evil were possible then some evil is unjustified, and such a world would be incompatible with God's attributes.

In this paper I shall consider theistic responses to the problem of moral evil. I shall begin by showing why the onus is on the theist to show that moral evil does not render theism indefensible. Next, I shall consider lines of defense offered by the theist. I find it necessary to distinguish between two sorts of theism, what I shall call perfect-world theism and imperfect-world theism. The only difference between these two types of theism is that perfect-world theism rests, for its successful defense, on its being the case that this is the best of all possible worlds. I take Leibniz to be a representative of this view, for he clearly claimed that this is the best of all possible worlds. Imperfect-world theism, for the purpose of this paper, does not require that this be the best of all possible worlds, but only that this world be the best world that it was logically possible for God to create. I take as representatives of this view Professors Alvin Plantinga and Keith Yandell. Both versions of theism, however, depend upon its being the case that there is no unnecessary evil in the world. Both versions employ the free will argument to make their case. I shall argue that perfect-world theism is logically contradictory and that imperfect-world theism either is contradictory or entails moral judgments which are incompatible with other of its essential tenets.

Mr. Lovin is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Southwest Texas State University.

I

The free will argument holds that moral evil—evil and suffering which result from men's own choices and conduct—is justified on the ground that a world in which men have freedom to choose evil as well as good is a better world than one in which men lack such freedom. The theist assures us that he is not insensitive to human suffering. He deplores the evil that men inflict upon other men by their choices and immoral conduct. But he insists that a world in which men have free wills is *better* than a world in which men do not have free wills, and being free means being able to choose evil as well as good.[1]

One essential tenet of theism is now clear. God must be conceived as having moral obligations similar to those incumbent upon men. If this were not so, evil would not present a problem and the theist would not have to justify its presence in the world. But this symmetry of obligations shared by God and men creates a certain difficulty for the theist. For even if free will and always choosing the good are somehow impossible or contradictory, it can reasonably be inquired whether free will is sufficiently valuable to justify all of the evil it produces. Obviously, a man who could have prevented another man from torturing someone, and yet did nothing, is morally blameworthy. He could not justify his lack of action by claiming that to have intervened would have required restricting the exercise of the torturer's free will and that that would have been worse than allowing the torture. If it is possible to prevent needless cruelty by restraining the exercise of the torturer's free will, it is right to do so. If a man would have a duty to intervene in this way, why would not God likewise be required to intervene? It is clearly the burden of the theist to prove that this exercise of the torturer's free will is worth the cost.

The important point here, however, is that the theist is prevented by his own argument from saying that what is obligatory upon men cannot be shown to be obligatory upon Deity. He cannot take the position that an impasse has been reached and that the theist and atheist alike must fall back on intuitions which are irreconcilably different. For if God does not have obligations similar to men's, it would not be necessary to justify evil, and the free will defense would be superfluous. In that case God could have created, without blameworthiness, a world with even more evil in it than this world. In the absence of obligations similar to men's, God would not have to create the best possible world. But it would then become quite impossible to specify what it means to say that God is morally perfect. In other words, if a genuinely better world was possible, and if God could have created it but did not, he cannot be conceived as perfectly good.

Further, if God has only some obligations similar to those men have, it appears purely arbitrary to say *which* he has. It is the introduction of the free will argument that shows that the theist does find it necessary to justify the ways of God toward men. For it is the possession of free will that is supposed to show why God has not done wrong in creating a bad world (a world with

some evil in it). So it is clear that the theist cannot, at this stage in the discussion, fall back on intuitions differing from those held by the atheist. Indeed, the successful defense of theism requires an argument to show that all instances of moral evil are necessary and justified.

II

In this section I shall deal with perfect-world theism, which holds that the existent world is the best of all possible worlds. Although I take Leibniz as a representative of this view, my remarks are not directed exclusively to his theodicy but to possible variations of it as well. All references to the theist in this section are to be read as applying to the perfect-world theist.

The theist says that this is the best of all possible worlds.[2] He does not deny that there is evil in the world; he simply holds that a world containing evil can be shown to be better than a world not containing evil. And the reason a world containing moral evil is said to be better than a world not containing moral evil is that moral evil is the result of free will, the value of which outweighs any good that could be achieved in its absence. But there is a fatal flaw in this argument. The very freedom to which the theist appeals to defend his claim about the justification of moral evil can be shown to undermine his argument.

Suppose that at some time in the past X tortured Y. The theist has to say that a world which includes the suffering of Y at X's hand is better than, or at least as good as, a world in which X did not torture Y. Initially, this sounds like an incredibly insensitive thing for the theist to say, and something which makes a shambles of our most certain moral judgments. But the theist would deny that he is guilty of this charge of moral blindness and insensitivity. He would reply that of course it would have been better if X had freely chosen not to torture, but instead to help, Y. The theist deplores X's action; his claim is that a world in which X can freely choose, even if he chooses to torture Y, is better than a world in which he had no choice. In the absence of choice we are told that the world would consist of automata programmed by God to do good, and that such a world would be less good than a world in which men are genuinely free.

Now when the theist speaks of free will he means a capacity which men have for choosing, freely, between alternative courses of action. Thus, X can be said to have freely chosen to torture Y if it had been possible for him to have freely chosen not to torture Y. The sense of freedom to which the theist appeals here is the kind of freedom that the ethicist recognizes to be a necessary condition of ascribing either blame or praise to an agent. This reflects the view that in morals the claim "I could not help it," if true, is always an excuse. A man who tortures another is responsible only if it was possible for him to have acted otherwise; that is, if it was possible for him to have freely chosen not to torture the other person.

Consider again the theist's claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. There are several interpretations of what the "best possible world" might mean. I wish to begin by distinguishing three such interpretations, the first two of which are included to show what the theist does *not* mean by "best possible world." It is important to include the first two interpretations not only to show the range of possible interpretations, but also to help guard against an illicit shifting from one interpretation to another.

1. If it is meant that the best of all possible worlds *must* include the *particular evil* of X torturing Y, and that a world in which X did not torture Y would have been less good, then X could not have acted otherwise and the free will argument collapses. In other words, since the theist claims that only the best of all possible worlds can exist, and since the existent world includes specific instances of moral evil, no one could have acted otherwise since had he done so this would not be the best of all possible worlds. But if men could not have acted otherwise they did not act freely, and free will can no longer be used to justify moral evil.

2. Another interpretation of the "best of all possible worlds" is that the best possible world includes X freely choosing to torture Y. If X had not freely chosen to torture Y this would not have been the best possible world. From this it follows that X should be commended (or at least not blamed) for torturing Y. On this interpretation Hitler ought to be commended (or at least not blamed), since he heightened and intensified good. But this is an interpretation which the theist must reject as absurd, for it renders meaningless all moral judgments and admonitions, including those which are essential to theism, such as the Ten Commandments or the ethical principles expressed in the Sermon on the Mount.

3. The theist deplores all instances of moral evil in the world. He means by saying that this is the best of all possible worlds, that a world in which men can freely choose evil as well as good is a better world than a world in which men can choose only good.[3] He deplores the torturing of Y by X and says that a world in which X had freely chosen to help Y would have been better than a world in which X had freely chosen to torture Y. But a necessary condition of X freely choosing to torture Y is that X could have freely chosen not to torture Y. And if it was possible for X to have freely chosen not to torture Y, then a world in which X so chose is a possible world. Therefore, on his own terms, since it was possible for X to have freely chosen not to torture Y this cannot be the best of all possible worlds.

But suppose that the theist were to respond as follows. Suppose he allows that if X had freely chosen not to torture Y then, in that respect, the other world would have been better. But he might claim that in that other world there would have been, in one way or another, just as much, or more, evil. So on the whole, that other world would not have been better.

This is a dangerous argument for the theist to embrace, since it threatens the very character of the free will response. That is, he appeals to free will to justify (and hence explain) moral evil. But when it becomes apparent that free will cannot justify a particular instance of evil (X torturing Y) because it was possible for X to freely choose not to torture Y, the theist retreats to different ground. He now claims that had X chosen not to torture Y the world, in some way, would have been as bad or worse than it is with X's torturing Y. But for this to be a satisfactory response there must be some evidence, independent of X's torturing Y, that shows that a world without the torture would contain as much or more evil.

To make this point clear consider the following example. Suppose that A and B are lost in the wilderness and have been seriously injured in some accident. Suppose that both are going to die and they know it, that both are suffering greatly, that A has an ample supply of medicine that will relieve their pain, and that A hates B and does not share with him the pain-relieving medicine. Now A's action of not sharing the medicine is, *ex hypothesis,* a free action (or omission); he could have done otherwise. Both men die, but A dies peacefully and B dies horribly. Now to say that if A had shared with B, and both had died peacefully, that world would have contained as much or more evil than the one in which A did not share with B, may be true, although it is extremely difficult to imagine how. But while the theist's assertion that the other world would have contained as much or more evil, without providing independent evidence to support it, may, in language reminiscent of Hume, save the conclusion that God's moral perfection is compatible with moral evil, it certainly does not establish that conclusion. And it was precisely for the purpose of establishing that this is the best of all possible worlds that the free will argument was introduced.

There is another equally serious difficulty with this kind of response by the theist. It has already been shown that the theist would have to have *independent* evidence of the good consequences of morally evil acts even to save his conclusion. But for the theist to take this position, and argue that there is such independent evidence, he would have to demonstrate the evidence for *each* evil choice, a task which is clearly impossible. If, however, the theist attempts to offer a general argument to show that the consequences of each evil choice are *always* better than those that would have followed from good choices, there is no point in calling them evil choices. Indeed, if every instance of moral evil that has ever occurred, or will ever occur, is such that if the agent had freely chosen otherwise the world would be just as bad or worse, the distinction between good and evil choices vanishes.

The upshot of all this is that the theist cannot adopt interpretation three, which has the consequence of denying that this is the best of all possible worlds, unless he can somehow show that every instance of choosing evil

produces good. Any general argument which purports to show this obliterates the distinction between good and evil choices, and interpretation three then collapses into interpretation two.

So, of the three possible interpretations of the theist's claim that this is the best of all possible worlds the first disallows his free will defense, for in that interpretation there is no freedom. The second interpretation is a *reductio ad absurdum,* for it entails the meaninglessness of moral judgments fervently endorsed by the theist. Further, since the free will defense is a *moral* defense, the second interpretation is self-contradictory because it entails the impossibility of meaningful moral judgments. The third interpretation perserves the sense of freedom necessary for the theist's claim and it allows for the possibility of genuine moral judgments, but it has the consequence of showing that this is not the best possible world.

The very nature of the free will appealed to by the theist has been shown to contradict his claim that this is the best possible world. Hence the free will response to the problem of moral evil does not solve the problem. Rather, it presents the problem in a more acute form. Since granting free will entails that this is not the best of all possible worlds, the theist must either provide another justification of moral evil or admit that there is in the world unnecessary evil that cannot be reconciled with God's attributes. In the absence of another argument justifying moral evil, the only reasonable position is to reject the theist's claim that there exists a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly benevolent.

The theist might try to defend himself against this argument along the following lines. His claim that being free entails being free to choose evil as well as good has not been attacked here. And since we are talking about the choices of men and not gods, he might argue that some evil must be chosen. Therefore, he might say, free will does justify moral evil.

But this will not do. For even if we grant his claim about freedom entailing that evil sometimes be chosen, this only shows that *some* moral evil is justified on the basis of free will and not that *this* instance of evil is so justified. To show that *this* particular instance of moral evil is necessary and justified would require an additional argument, and that is precisely what the theist does not have. The problem is not just that the theist is unable, now, to provide another argument; the problem is that his argument about free will precludes any other argument. For a logical consequence of his claim about free will is that this is *not* the best of all possible worlds, and yet the successful defense of his claims about God requires that this *must be* the best of all possible worlds. Therefore the theist's argument designed to justify moral evil is logically contradictory and must be rejected.

To sum up, it has been argued that if there are no instances of moral evil such that the agent could have freely chosen otherwise, it then follows that there is no freedom. And if there is no freedom the free will response cannot

explain the occurrence of moral evil. But if there are instances in the world (even a single instance) where a man chooses evil but could have chosen otherwise, then a world in which he does choose otherwise (good) is a possible world. And by the theist's own admission to choose the good freely is better than to choose evil freely. Hence, this is not the best of all possible worlds.

The dilemma confronting the theist is forced upon him by the requirements of theism itself. He must deplore moral evil. To deplore moral evil he must postulate freedom. The freedom required to act either in a morally blameworthy or a morally praiseworthy manner requires that men be able to choose between different possible worlds. To deny this is to deny freedom. To allow this is to admit that this is not the best of all possible worlds. Either is fatal to perfect-world theism.

III

In this section my argument is directed against imperfect-world theism, the view that while this is not the best possible world, it is, nevertheless, the best world that it was logically possible for God to create. All references to the theist in this section are to be read as applying to the imperfect-world theist.

The theist might try to reconstruct his argument in the following way. He might deny the Leibnizian claim "that this universe must be in reality better than every other possible universe."[4] He might admit that it has been shown that this is not the best of all possible worlds. But he might argue that so far from undermining orthodox theism, this only relieves the theist of having to claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. All that the theist need claim is that this is the best world that it was logically possible for God to create. That is, the theist might concede that a better world is possible (one in which X freely chose not to torture Y), but maintain that it was logically impossible for God to have created it since he would then have had to cause X to choose not to torture Y, in that case denying genuine freedom to X. It is no limitation on God's power or his goodness to say that he did not create a better world, although such a world is logically possible.

Alvin Plantinga seems to adopt this position, for he writes:

> Now God can create free creatures, but he cannot causally or otherwise determine them to do only what is right; for if he does so then they do not do what is right freely.[5]

Keith Yandell also seems to favor this position, for he argues that it is open to the theist to accept the following propositions:

> (1) It is a logically necessary condition of any world in which there is moral value that there be free agents in that world. . . .
> (3) It is logically impossible that God, in a world where there are free agents, prevent that any evil choices are made (since then the agents would not be free).[6]

Yandell does acknowledge that these propositions are enormously complicated. He believes, however, that whatever the nature of the dispute about them, the worst that can result for the theist is an impasse and that no contradiction can be established.

The theist's position is now seen to involve the claim that free will and the moral good which it makes possible are so valuable that even though a better world is logically possible, it is not a world which it was possible for God to create. But when this line of defense is analyzed, it turns out that the kind of freedom required to make the theist's argument tenable is an extreme form of metaphysical indeterminism. Professor Stephen T. Davis acknowledges this, for he says that it is clear that the free will defense "is based upon a definite libertarianism, i.e. upon a concept of genuine possibilities that implies real indeterminism."[7] Davis further says:

> If God creates [man] such that [man] will always choose the good, [man] is no longer free to choose the evil. He is not free because he is somehow being influenced by God, and as we have seen, to say that [man] is 'free' is precisely to rule out any external interference or influence.[8]

It is clear that the freedom which the theist posits rules out absolutely any form of "compatibilism" such that an act can be regarded as both free and caused. For if an act can be free and still be regarded as the effect of some cause —the agent's character and disposition, the moral advice of teachers or friends, the examples set by other morally exemplary persons whose lives have influenced the agent—then God could have, and should have, governed the causes in such a way as to bring about free choices of moral good. If the instruction and example of a parent can be a causally influencing factor in a child's free choices for good, then God could, without in any way denying freedom, have created a world in which men freely choose good most, if not all, of the time.

Antony Flew has recently argued that compatibilism not only provides the correct way of understanding human conduct, including free conduct, but also that it is an essential tenet of theism itself.[9] He cites impressive evidence from St. Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther to show that libertarian free will entails a premise from which we may deduce that God does not exist.

It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of the compatibilist thesis, other than to point out that if some form of compatibilism is true, the free will argument fails to justify moral evil. This is the case because the free will posited by the theist was thought to explain moral evil, since without the freedom to choose evil as well as good, the moral value of free agents would be denied. But if some form of compatibilism is true, the moral value so highly regarded by the theist does not justify all the moral evil that free will produces.

In other words, if compatibilism is true, God could have governed causes in such a way as to allow for free choices which do not include choosing evil.[10] To deny this is to deny God's omnipotence, to allow this is to say that there is some unjustified evil in the world.

The theist is now faced with a different dilemma. Moral value is said to be possible only through the exercise of free will, which is not compatible with causes of any type, including character, dispositions, exhortations, examples, advice, instruction, and so forth. But it follows from this that the moral assessments of praise and blame that everyone (including the theist) makes are logically inappropriate. We very often praise people, parents for example, for providing the moral instruction and guidance which result in honorable and decent children. But if this moral training in any way functions as a cause in bringing about the good character of their children, then the parents are not praiseworthy; rather, they are blameworthy for having deprived their children of the possibility of freely choosing to become honorable and decent.

Now it is the theist who insists that freedom, in his sense, is all-important. Without this freedom the moral value of choosing the good would be denied. But if this is true, the achievement of the all-important values of honesty and integrity has been denied the children, in the example above, since the parent's instruction functioned as a cause. It would have been better to have left them utterly alone so that they might freely choose to be honest and trustworthy. On the other hand, if moral guidance and training do not function as a cause in the development of good character, what is the point of them? How should we then understand such Biblical admonitions as "Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it"?[11]

It is only in the view that there is a causal connection between moral education and conduct that there is any point to such admonitions. But if there is such a connection, and if the choices for good which thereby result are free choices, it follows that an act can be both free and caused. If a parent has an obligation to govern causes in such a way as to increase the likelihood of morally good choices by his children, then God could do the same without depriving his creatures of their freedom. Parents often fail in this regard because of miscalculations or ignorance or simply an inability properly to construct the causal environment. But God, owing to his omniscience and omnipotence, would never similarly fail.

That people do in fact regard a person's choices and conduct as the effect of antecedent causes is exhibited not only in moral situations where we praise or blame accordingly, but also in our whole social and legal structure. It is because a person's choices and the resultant conduct are thought to be affected substantially by background, environment, guidance, and example, that children are sometimes taken away from parents and placed in foster homes or made wards of the court. For similar reasons persons living in ghettos are

sometimes excused for conduct that would be harshly treated elsewhere. On the same grounds courts sometimes accept as mitigating or extenuating circumstances a person's previous experiences or homelife.

The position adopted by the theist, then, turns out to be either contradictory or a species of the second interpretation of "best possible world" given in section II. It is contradictory if compatibilism is true. Free will and the moral value it makes possible were offered as the justification for moral evil. But if compatibilism is true, free will does not justify moral evil. For in that case God could have caused men to choose the good, freely, all or most of the time. Hence, there is unnecessary evil in the world which cannot be reconciled with an all powerful, all knowing, and all good God.

If compatibilism is rejected as false on the ground that there is no causal connection between moral instruction and conduct, it follows that we can no longer praise or blame people for the moral guidance (or lack of it) that they provide for their children or others. For on this view there would be no efficacy, and hence no point, in attempts to help others, through instruction or by example, to develop good character from which right choices will follow. And if compatibilism is rejected on the ground that causes or influences which affect behavior remove that behavior from the realm of free (and hence morally evaluable) action, equally disastrous results follow. In this case we should rightly blame parents, or others, who influence people to do right, since they would thereby have made their action unfree.

In either case, a consequence of denying compatibilism is that the whole of moral life and the use of normative language become meaningless or unintelligible. After all, it is because early moral training is believed to influence future conduct that responsible and thoughtful parents expend so much of their energies to provide it. It is because factors in a person's environment are believed to influence and shape conduct that so much attention is directed to ordering that environment properly. And people are praised or blamed for their conduct, in large measure, because the very act of praising and blaming is thought to encourage good behavior and deter bad behavior.

The only way for the theist to escape the consequences entailed by the denial of compatibilism is to provide entirely new conceptual frameworks for understanding not only moral phenomena but the whole social and legal structure of our society as well. But this would be an enormously difficult thing to do. Since what would be called for would be entirely new conceptual *frameworks* and *ethical* concepts, no factual proposition, or collection of factual propositions, could entail the desired results. And since the concepts required to save the theist's argument would be radically new, they could not be supported by our present normative concepts and judgments.

Further, to construct successfully such totally new conceptual frameworks, and to demonstrate that they are consistent with a thoroughgoing indeterminism, the theist would have to show that human action and choices cannot, even

in principle, be explained in causal terms. But this is something he cannot do, since it would always be possible to discover in the future that there are causal explanations for the conduct in question. The most that the theist could hope for would be that moral conduct could not be shown to be explicable in causal terms which still preserve the necessary conditions for assessing responsibility and applying moral predicates. But if my argument is correct, not only is there overwhelming evidence that moral phenomena are explicable in causal terms, but that our whole way of thinking and speaking about such phenomena presupposes causal explanations. In any case, the disastrous consequences of the total rejection of all forms of compatibilism could not be overcome by patchwork philosophy or theology; the *whole* of our present conceptual framework for understanding moral, social, and legal phenomena would have to be replaced.

Perhaps the problem confronting the theist, and the nature of my argument, can be more forcefully stated by considering one of Jesus' parables. A lawyer, trying to trick Jesus, asked: "And who is my neighbour?" Jesus, recognizing the lawyer's insincerity and desiring to teach his disciples something about the moral requirements of Christian love, responded with the parable of the Good Samaritan. The point of the story was to impress upon his hearers that one's neighbor is anyone in need, and that our obligation is to render help to such persons whenever and however we can. After criticizing the behavior of the priest and the Levite, Jesus praised the mercy of the Samaritan and admonished his disciples to "Go, and do thou likewise."

If the theist denies absolutely that freedom and causality of any sort are compatible, he must say that the disciples who took Jesus' story to heart, and because of its impact acted accordingly, were deprived by Jesus of the opportunity to do real moral good. And since Jesus' parable was a cause in their befriending those in need, Jesus is blameworthy for having disallowed the greater good of their freely choosing to minister to the needy.

The sort of freedom necessary for the theist's argument to hold is an indeterminism so radical that it destroys everyone's notion of praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. But if a freedom less extreme is posited, it would be possible for an action to be both free and caused. In that case God is culpable for not having created a world in which free agents bring about a greater amount of moral good.

IV

My arguments, if correct, have the following consequences. The existence of moral evil is a problem for the theist because God, to be conceived as morally perfect, must be conceived as having moral obligations similar to men's. It is for this reason that the theist must show that God did not do wrong in creating a world with moral evil in it. Thus, the theist must argue either that

this is the best of all possible worlds (perfect-world theism), or that this is the best world that it was logically possible for God to create (imperfect-world theism).

Perfect-world theism is logically contradictory and must be rejected. The very freedom appealed to by the theist to justify moral evil was shown to entail that this is not the best of all possible worlds. Imperfect-world theism is contradictory if some form of compatibilism is true, for in that case God could have governed causes in such a way as to provide for free choices of the good all, or most, of the time. But if compatibilism is rejected, our ordinary moral concepts and judgments, including those essential to theism, are rendered absurd or meaningless. In either case, the problem of moral evil is not only intractable, it is insuperable.

NOTES

1. The claim that a world in which men always freely choose good is not a possible world seems incorrect. Although my argument does not hang on the outcome of that dispute, a discussion of the matter can be found in "Evil and Omnipotence" by J. L. Mackie, *Mind* **64** (1955): 200–212; and in "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom" by Antony Flew, in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology,* ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 144–169.

2. Leibniz says: "It follows from the supreme perfection of God, that in creating the universe he has chosen the best possible plan. . . . For since all the possibles in the understanding of God laid claim to existence in proportion to their perfections, the result of all these claims must be the most perfect actual world that is possible." *The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,* reprinted in *Leibniz,* ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 528.

3. Although this is the interpretation that I suggest the perfect-world theist accepts, it is not altogether clear that this is the interpretation accepted by Leibniz. The following passage sounds as though he were endorsing the second interpretation, since this universe, including its specific evil choices, is said by him to be better than any other. He writes:

> I have added, following many good authors, that it was in accordance with order and the general good that God allowed to certain creatures the opportunity of exercising their liberty, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil, but which he could so well rectify; because it was not fitting that, in order to hinder sin, God should always act in an extraordinary manner. . . . it is sufficient to show that a world with evil might be better than a world without evil; but I have gone even farther. . . . and have even proved that this universe must be in reality better than every other possible universe. *The Theodicy,* reprinted in *Leibniz,* ed. Wiener, p. 510.

4. Ibid.

5. Alvin Plantinga, *God and Other Minds* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 132.

6. Keith Yandell, *Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 49.

7. Stephen T. Davis, "A Defense of the Free Will Defense," *Religious Studies,* December 1972, p. 335.

8. Ibid., p. 342.

9. Antony Flew, "Compatibilism, Free Will and God," *Philosophy,* July 1973.

10. It is interesting to note that Leibniz endorsed a form of compatibilism. He says that "the predetermination of events by causes is just what contributes to morality instead of destroying it, and causes incline the will, without compelling it." Wiener, p. 515.

11. *Proverbs* 22:6.